"Educational technology entered the classroom through the one door that parents trust most. The evaluation framework measured engagement and test scores. It never measured what the software was doing to the attention architecture of the children using it."
Educational technology companies entered schools through trust channels that bypassed the procurement and evaluation scrutiny applied to other institutional purchases. Direct teacher adoption without administrator review. Emergency purchasing provisions deployed during COVID-19 that suspended normal vetting. Grant-funded pilots that created adoption without accountability structures. App stores that gave individual teachers deployment authority over products used on student devices. The Trust Arbitrage: exploiting the trust that parents place in schools to deploy data-collection and engagement architectures that would face scrutiny if proposed directly to families.
Once inside, EdTech was evaluated against metrics that systematically excluded the harm it was producing: engagement scores, standardized test correlation, educator satisfaction. Not attention architecture effects. Not behavioral modification consequences. Not data collection scope. The evaluation framework was designed — or at minimum structured — to be navigated, and EdTech companies navigated it without encountering the developmental harms their products produced.
The data collected in the process is the most comprehensive behavioral record ever assembled on children in institutional contexts. FERPA's 1974 framework, designed for paper records, did not protect them. The Classroom Covenant — the minimum conditions under which educational technology can be deployed without producing these harms — is the constructive close of Saga IX's developmental argument.